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The Right to Shout Fire in a Crowded
Theatre: Hateful Speech and the First
Amendment
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUCTION
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dictum that the First Amendment
“would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre,” 1
summarizes free speech law for many people. They think it allows
Congress to make some laws restricting, if the laws are necessary,
even though the First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging freedom of speech or of the press.”2 Plug “falsely
shouting fire in a crowded theater” into Google and you will find
over 3.3 million results.3 Remove the adjective, “crowded” (Justice
Holmes did not use it), and the references climb to about 9 million.4
Limit the phrase to case citations in Westlaw, and you find over 200
cases and another 200 court documents. These references are often
approving if not fawning.
Yet, if we look closely at what the law as it is now—rather than
as Justice Holmes imagined it, or as Justice Holmes thought it
should be—we will see that Justice Holmes was wrong. It would be
a very rare circumstance that the government could constitutionally
prohibit one from shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre.
The United States Supreme Court has travelled on a long
and twisting path to reach that destination. We owe our thanks

* Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman
University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. This Article is being published as part of Chapman Law
Review symposium honoring the life and work of Professor Ronald Rotunda (1945-2018).
1 The full quotation is:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (internal citations omitted).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
3 Note, the number of results is as of April 10, 2019.
4 Note, the number of results is as of April 10, 2019.
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to the Greek philosophers and playwrights who first blazed that
trail, nearly two and one-half millennia ago.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court now protects hateful
speech, such as a burning cross.5 It protects threats against the
life of the President, except for the narrow category of “true
‘threat[s].’”6 In general, speech alone (in contrast to speech plus
an action or an activity) is protected,7 which is why there is a
constitutional right to lie about receiving the Congressional
Medal of Honor,8 although not a right to commit fraud (e.g., by
using deceptive speech to take money under false pretenses).
Those who receive government grants even have a free speech
right to receive these subsidies while rejecting a government
requirement that they affirm in their award documents that they
are “opposed to prostitution . . . .”9
5 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366–67 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
6 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). The Court did not
invalidate, on its face, the statute (8 U.S.C. § 871(a)) which prohibits threats against the
President. It did overturn the conviction, directed an acquittal, and explained that the
government must prove more than that the defendant said the forbidden words. See id. at
707. “[A] statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 707–08.
“Hundreds of celebrity howlers threaten the President of the United States every
year, sometimes because they disagree with his policies, but more often just because he is
the President”—yet there is no prosecution. STALKING, THREATENING, AND ATTACKING
PUBLIC FIGURES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 111 (J. Reid Meloy,
Lorraine Sheridan & Jens Hoffmann eds., 2008).
7 There are a few categories of speech that the Court historically has not protected,
such as “obscenity” and “defamation,” both terms of art that are narrowly defined. New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 271–74 (1964) (analyzing “defamation” and
“knowing falsehood” about public officials); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973)
(defining obscenity as “patently offensive representations . . . of ultimate sexual acts” that
lack “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). Such decisions, however, do
nothing to undercut the protection the First Amendment gives to hateful speech.
8 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012). This case made clear
that there are very few constitutional content-based restrictions on free speech:
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted . . . only when confined
to the few “‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] . . . . Among these
categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite lawless action, obscenity,
defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called “fighting words,” child
pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent
threat the government has the power to prevent . . . .
Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted).
9 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 210, 221 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Justice Roberts, for the Court, held that the Agency
for International Development’s (AID) requirement violated the First Amendment because it
compels, as a condition of federal funding, recipients to affirm a belief that, by its nature,
cannot be confined within the scope of the government program. Id. There is a constitutional
distinction between (1) conditions that define the limits of the government spending program
(that is, they specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize) and (2) conditions that try to
leverage funding “to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.” Id. at 214–15.
The law may require that the grantee may not use federal funds to promote or
advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution. Id. at 218. However, the government’s
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When the Court allows prohibitions of some speech, such as
perjury, it makes clear that it is speech plus something else.10 If I
hold a gun to your head and say, “give me your money or your
life,” I’m engaging in conduct (robbery) accompanied by words. If
I say, “I wish I had Bill Gates’ money,” or, “I hate the idle rich,” I
am just engaging in speech.
Another example is speech that proposes an illegal
commercial transaction. If it is illegal to hire an assassin, the law
can make it illegal to publish an advertisement that says,
“Wanted: A hitman; no questions asked.”11
Similarly, a law that prohibits aiding and abetting a
“foreign terrorist organization,” can apply to a group that uses
speech to support the lawful and nonviolent purposes of the
terrorist organization because the law does not ban “pure
political speech. . . .”12 It bans speech plus, that is, speech used
in connection with an activity in order to help the terrorist
group under the direction of that group.
An organization or individual can say or advocate whatever
they want. They can argue, if they wish, that Hamas is a good
organization and its methods are justified. That is independent
advocacy. However, the Court upheld a statute limiting speech
that aided foreign terrorists because it did not limit pure speech.
It “reaches only material support coordinated with or under the
direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting the

second requirement is invalid, because it improperly leverages funding. Id. at 215–16. It
requires a funding recipient to “espouse a specific belief as its own.” Id. at 219. This Policy
Requirement, “by its very nature” affects speech outside the scope of the federally funded
program. Id. at 218. It “goes beyond preventing” grantees from using private funds in a
way that would undermine the federal program. Id. at 220. “It requires them to pledge
allegiance to the [g]overnment’s policy of eradicating prostitution.” Id. This “Policy
Requirement compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by
its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the [g]overnment program.” Id.
10 “It is not simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First
Amendment protection.” Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720. When the Court allows civil or criminal
penalties for “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a
false statement” there is speech plus something else, “such as an invasion of privacy or
the costs of vexatious litigation.” Id. at 719. Perjury, that is, intentionally introducing
false evidence, interferes with a trial in the same way that an action, such as introducing
a forged document, interferes with a fair trial. Id. at 720. As the Court said in United
States v. Dunnigan, “[t]o uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality
of perjury statutes is unquestioned.” 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).
11 It is not “an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
Instit. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011).
12 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28–29 (2010).
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group’s legitimacy is not covered.” 13 Congress may enact this
statute to prevent terrorist organizations like Hamas from using
“its overt political and charitable organizations as a financial and
logistical support network for its terrorist operations.”14
The government cannot limit the speaker simply because the
audience is upset with the words spoken. There is no longer any
heckler’s veto, even when the speaker spews forth hate. Thus, the
Nazis have a constitutional right to march through Skokie,
Illinois, a town that the American Nazis chose specifically
because a large number of Holocaust survivors lived there. 15 The
point of the Nazi march was to impose psychic harm—yet the
First Amendment still protected it.16
In order to understand modern speech doctrine, where
people have a right to lie, to march celebrating Nazi hate, to
advocate anarchy, to accept federal money while rejecting some
of the conditions attached to it—to know how we arrived here,
with substantially more free speech rights than Justice Holmes
would ever have imagined—we have to understand free speech’s
ancient roots.
It is more important than ever to understand the intellectual
rationale of modern free expression, and learn why Justice
Holmes was wrong, because today, free speech is under renewed
attack from those who used to be its supporters.
The usual suspects who reject free speech would include
terrorists, like those who, in 2015, attacked Charlie Hebdo, the
satirical French newspaper, and claimed twelve lives.17 To that group
there is another, more surprising addition—those who intimated that
Charlie Hebdo had it coming to them. These people argued that those
who parody should exercise self-censorship if the objects of their
satire are prone to violence.18 In other words, blame the victim.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 31 (quoting MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM
IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 2 (2006)).
15 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198–200 (7th Cir. 1978). The members of the
National Socialist Party of America, clothed with the swastika and other symbols of the
Nazis, planned to march in front of the Village Hall in Skokie, a Chicago suburb with a large
Jewish population, including several thousand survivors of the Holocaust. Id. The court
invalidated various attempts to forbid the march, including ordinance No. “995,” prohibiting
the dissemination of any materials promoting and inciting racial hatred. Id. at 1207.
16 Id.
17 Ronald D. Rotunda, Je Suis Charlie Hebdo, V ERDICT (Feb. 16, 2015),
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/02/16/je-suis-charlie-hebdo?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=
wordtwit&utm_medium=web [http://perma.cc/N2TL-UUDM].
18 See, e.g., Erik Wemple, On CNN, Jay Carney Sticks to Position that Charlie Hebdo
Should Have Pulled Back, WASH. P OST (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/01/08/on-cnn-jay-carney-sticks-to-position-that-charlie-hebdoshould-have-pulled-back/?utm_term=.28144e322e05 [http://perma.cc/JA74-JJ5B]; Charles Lane,
13
14
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What is even more troubling is that to the list of usual
suspects, we must add some unusual suspects—those who think
of themselves as liberal and supportive of free speech yet justify
restriction to prohibit what they regard as hateful or hurtful
speech. That group is more worrisome, because its members used
to be the champions of free speech.
Our universities are educating the leaders of tomorrow.
These future leaders do not believe in free speech. We know from
news reports that when university students do not agree with a
viewpoint of a speaker, the students protest, sometimes
violently.19 Recent surveys show that the protestors are not
merely a small but vocal minority. Instead, they are a majority.20
If we survey Democrats, Republicans, or Independents, fewer
than half think the First Amendment protects speech the students
regard as “hate speech.”21 A significant number of students,
regardless of political affiliation, believe it is completely
appropriate for students to disrupt a speaker so that no one in the
audience can hear him or her.22 One-fifth of all college students
believe that violence is appropriate to prevent the speaker from
being able to speak at all.23 In 1984, twenty percent of college
students thought that universities should ban speakers they
considered extreme.24 By 2015, that percentage more than doubled
to forty-three percent.25
Charlie Hebdo’s Editors Took Big Risks to Defend Freedom of Expression ,
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-lane-charliehebdos-editors-took-risks-to-defend-the-freedom-of-expression/2015/01/07/8b4a3782-9694-11e4927a-4fa2638cd1b0_story.html?utm_term=.819dfad16d51 [http://perma.cc/3Y4S-6K57].
19 See Lisa Rathke, US colleges confront a new era of sometimes-violent protest, AP
NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/116336dc947e4e8faba1d5ccd1805398/UScolleges-confront-a-new-era-of-sometimes-violent-protest [http://perma.cc/G9RL-AZ27].
20 See John Villasenor, Views among college students regarding the First
Amendment: Results from a new survey, B ROOKINGS INST . (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/views-among-college-students-regardingthe-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/ [http://perma.cc/NQK7-5NH2].
21 Id. (finding only thirty-nine percent of students surveyed believe hate speech
is protected).
22 Id. (finding fifty-one percent of students surveyed agreed with the statement “A
student group opposed to the speaker disrupts the speech by loudly and repeatedly
shouting so that the audience cannot hear the speaker. Do you agree or disagree that the
student group’s actions are acceptable?”).
23 Id. (finding nineteen percent of students agreed with the statement “A student
group opposed to the speaker uses violence to prevent the speaker from speaking. Do you
agree or disagree that the student group’s actions are acceptable?”).
24 See Jean M. Twenge, The Smartphone Generation vs. Free Speech, WALL ST . J.
(Sept. 1, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-smartphone-generation-vsfree-speech-1504274890.
25 See id.; see also Jean M. Twenge, Review --- The Smartphone Generation vs. Free
Speech --- Risk-Averse and Unaccustomed to Independence, they Flee From the ‘Hurt’ of Words,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2017, at C.3; JEAN M. TWENGE, iGEN: WHY TODAY’S SUPER-CONNECTED
KIDS ARE GROWING UP LESS REBELLIOUS, MORE TOLERANT, LESS HAPPY—AND COMPLETELY
UNPREPARED FOR ADULTHOOD 252 (2017).
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Instead of being bastions of free discourse, many universities
are now politically correct. Take Iowa State University for
example. Last year, it required its students to waive their free
speech rights. It explicitly told its students that they must agree,
in order to graduate, that the University can punish speech it
regards as “harassment” even though the student is “[e]ngaging
in First Amendment protected speech activities.”26 The inevitable
lawsuit followed, and the university settled and agreed to change
its ways.27 As the verified complaint explained—quoting the Iowa
State University’s “Student Disciplinary Regulations”—the
University’s “Discriminatory Harassment” policy prohibits
students from engaging in “unwelcome behavior” on the basis of
specific classifications, including religion, and confirms that
“[e]ngaging in First Amendment protected speech activities” may
be deemed harassment “depending upon the circumstances.”28
In law schools nowadays, it is common for constitutional law
professors to teach that there are many limits to the First
Amendment. Often, they begin a course on free speech by quoting
Justice Holmes, explaining that protection for free speech requires
“balance,” and then justifying whatever restrictions they would
like to impose. Although the First Amendment provides that
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press,”29 it does not really mean “no law”—that is how the
argument goes and its proponents use it to justify banning hate
speech, politically incorrect speech, and hurtful speech.30
Others to add to the list of those who reject First Amendment
values are some lower courts.31 They do not acknowledge the modern
vigorous protections for unpopular speech perhaps because they do

26 Verified Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 124, 133, Dunn v. Leath,
No. 4:16-CV-00553-JAJ-CFB (S.D. Iowa Oct. 17, 2016).
27 The University settled and changed its policies in 2017. See Settlement Agreement
& Release at 2, Dunn v. Leath, No. 4:16-CV-00553-JAJ-CFB (S.D. Iowa Oct. 17, 2016).
28 Verified Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 133.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 Professor and Judge Richard Posner frankly adopts a balancing test in First
Amendment cases. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 67 (2001)
(“[S]peech should be allowed if but only if its benefits equal or exceed its costs discounted by
their probability and by their futurity, and reduced by the costs of administering a ban.”).
See also Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (“I insist that bullfighting is an expressive activity,” but the state can still forbid
it “because in American society its harmful consequences are thought to outweigh its
expressive value”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
31 See, e.g., Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 767, 770 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding that a public school could prohibit students from wearing a symbol of
the American Flag on their clothing because doing so might upset some Mexican
American students); Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (overruling the panel which had upheld a heckler’s veto).
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not understand the modern rationale for free speech—a rationale
that traces its ancestry to ancient roots.
Typically, these people—university administrators, university
students, law school professors, lower courts, modern pundits—go
on to agree that the restrictions on free speech that occurred in
an earlier time were wrong and were not justified at the time,
but—there is always a “but”—today is different.
Justice Frankfurter is a typical example of this
phenomenon, and the vehicle he used to justify his position is
his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, in which the
Court upheld the conviction of the defendants for violating the
Smith Act. 32 Dennis came down in 1951, in the midst of the
second Red Scare, which lasted from about 1947 to mid-1950s. 33
It was the heyday of McCarthyism.
Justice Frankfurter agreed that the government overreacted to
the first Red Scare, in the 1920s, but the government, he said, is not
overreacting to the second Red Scare, which he was living through.34
Justice Frankfurter took “judicial notice” of the ascendancy
of the Communist doctrine in the 1950s because it was, to him, a
matter of “common knowledge,” and that knowledge “would
amply justify a legislature in concluding that recruitment of
additional members for the [Communist] Party would create a
substantial danger to national security.”35 What the Court is
doing now, said Justice Frankfurter, is not like what the Court
did in Gitlow v. New York, when it upheld a state conviction for
“criminal anarchy.”36 Justice Frankfurter would require:
[E]xcessive tolerance of the legislative judgment to suppose that the
Gitlow publication in the circumstances could justify serious concern.
In contrast, there is ample justification for a legislative judgment that
the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to national order
and security.37

In contemporary America, many of those who ridicule both
the first and the second Red Scare of yesteryear have no problem
attacking unpopular speech today, banning it, or limiting it to
certain “zones” with trigger warnings to protect the sensitive.
341 U.S. 494, 541–42 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 3
(1991); see also MICHAEL J. HEALE, MCCARTHY’S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN
STATE AND NATION , 1935–1965, at 2 (1998); LANDON R. Y. STORRS , THE SECOND RED
SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT 1 (2012).
34 See generally David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 22 (2003).
35 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654, 670 (1925).
37 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 541–42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32
33
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Like Justice Frankfurter, they say, “This time it’s different. The
prior generation overreacted, but what we are doing now is
justified.” That is the way the argument goes, and each
generation that justifies restrictions uses it.
The universities, which used to be the citadels of free
speech—think of the University of California, Berkeley, famous
for its “free speech movement” in the 1960s38—are now famous
for limiting free speech.39 Courts now justify banning students
from wearing t-shirts with the American Flag because showing it
might upset those who see it.40 In this new legal regime, we have
a right to burn the flag41 but not to display it.
Justice Frankfurter’s false distinction between the first Red
Scare and the second one, as well as Berkeley’s free speech
turnaround, should teach us that each generation must re-learn
the importance of free speech, even rebellious speech in time of
war, even speech that promotes hate, or advocates anarchy. And
to re-learn that lesson, we must start with the ancient Greeks.
II. PERICLES AND THE BIRTH OF FREE SPEECH
Over 2400 years ago, in the cradle of democracy, the people of
Athens believed that freedom of speech made their armies more
courageous, and that free speech made them stronger, not weaker.
Their philosophers, historians, and playwrights crafted the first
arguments favoring free speech and opposing government
regulation, even in time of war. The primary ancient Greek figures,
along with Pericles, were Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aeschylus.
Herodotus wrote the Histories, his History of the Persian
Wars (499–479 BC), in nine books. We sometimes refer to
Herodotus as the father of history.42 Before Herodotus, people
wrote history in the sense of chronicling events, writing lists
(there was a battle; a king lost; another king sealed his victory by
a propitious marriage, and so forth). Herodotus was different: He
was interested in why things happened; what caused nations or

See ROBERT COHEN, FREEDOM’S ORATOR: MARIO SAVIO AND THE RADICAL LEGACY
1960s 82 (2009).
39 John Woodrow Cox, Berkeley Gave Birth to the Free Speech Movement in the
1960s. Now, Conservatives are Demanding it Include Them, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/20/berkeley-gave-birth-tothe-free-speech-movement-in-the-1960s-now-conservatives-are-demanding-it-includethem/?utm_term=.2e7f010e6538 [http://perma.cc/5TQH-S5H3].
40 See Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 774–75 (9th Cir.
2014). Discussed infra.
41 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
42 J. A. S. Evans, Father of History or Father of Lies: The Reputation of Herodotus, 64
CLASSICAL J. 11 (1968).
38

OF THE

Do Not Delete

2019]

5/29/2019 2:36 PM

The Right to Shout Fire in a Crowded Theatre

327

leaders to do one thing or another.43 Our word, “history” comes
from the Greek wording meaning “inquiry” or “investigation.”44
Admittedly, he relied on oral recollections, rumors, and legends,
which is why others call him the father of lies.45
Herodotus sought to understand and explain why Athenians
could win victories over the more numerous Persians in the first
part of the fifth century BC46 His answer was that Athenians
fought as free people, not as slaves.47 It is not that the Athenians
were braver than the Persians were, or that their archers were
more accurate, or their weapons more advanced. Instead,
Herodotus argued, when the Athenians were under despotic
rulers, they “were no better in war than any of their neighbors,
yet once they got quit of despots they were far and away the first
of all,” because “when they were freed each man was zealous to
achieve for himself.”48 Freedom made the Athenians braver.
In contrast to Herodotus, Thucydides wrote about the history
of events that occurred during his lifetime. 49 He sought to
confirm facts through eyewitness accounts and written records.
Yet his histories were no transcript of what people said. In his
History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides included long
speeches that historical figures might have delivered. 50
Thucydides tells us that a custom of the times was for a
prominent figure to give a funeral oration.
In Book 2 of his History, he gives us the famous Funeral
Oration of Pericles. Although one might think that Thucydides
presents this speech as if it were a verbatim transcript of
Pericles’ discourse, Thucydides does not pretend that it is so.
Instead, he said the words represent what Pericles intended,
what he could have said, what was “called for in the situation.”51
The Funeral Oration indicates free speech was not merely a
theory of a few academicians. Democratically elected political
leaders were also embracing it. Pericles delivered his speech as a

See id. at 12.
Id.
45 See id. at 11; see also DONALD LATEINER, THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF HERODOTUS
8–9 (1989); DAVID SACKS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD 155 (Lisa R.
Brody ed., 2005).
46 LATEINER, supra note 45, at 182.
47 Id.
48 I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 50 (1988) (footnote omitted).
49 See Julia Kindt, Guide to the Classics: Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian
War, C ONVERSATION (June 12, 2017, 3:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/guide-to-theclassics-thucydidess-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war-71550 [http://perma.cc/ZZZ6-HGUL].
50 See id.
51 ALAN RYAN, ON POLITICS: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: F ROM HERODOTUS
TO THE PRESENT 23 (2012).
43
44
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tribute to those who died in the war that year.52 When he spoke,
the first year of Peloponnesian War was just ending.53
Thucydides tells us that Pericles argued that the Athenians
were stronger because they were free. Athens was not a formidable
city-state in spite of free speech but because of free speech. Pericles’
famous funeral oration argued:
Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner
or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if
revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management
or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands False The great
impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of
knowledge that is gained by discussion preparatory to action.54

Pericles does not focus on the achievements of Athens’ military.
Instead, he praises the Athenian form of government and its
protection of free speech.55
The final ancient figure justifying free speech as essential to
democracy is the playwright, Aeschylus. His play, The Persians,
echoed Herodotus and Thucydides. 56 He wrote it in 472 BC That
same year, this play won first prize at the dramatic competitions
in the City Dionysia festival of Athens.57 Remember that at this
time, in contrast to little city-state of Athens, dictators and kings
ruled the rest of the world.
Aeschylus explained that the Athenians were victorious
because, “[o]f no man are they the slaves or subjects.” 58 Art
reflects life, and Aeschylus, in his play, reflected what many
Athenians believed: Athenians should celebrate their victory not
as a victory of Greeks over Persians, but as a victory of free men
over slaves. “The victors at Salamis were men elevated and
inspired by the freedom to speak their minds and govern
themselves.”59 The Persians outnumbered the Greeks, but the
Greeks won a decisive victory led by Themistocles, a
non-aristocratic Athenian politician and general.
Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, along with political
leaders like Pericles, all embraced this ancient truth: People who
are free are people who work more intensely because they work
See Kindt, supra note 49.
Id.
Pericles, Funeral Oration, in BENJAMIN JOWETT, THUCYDIDES 116, 118–19
(Clarendon Press, 1881).
55 See id.
56 See Tim Rood, Thucydides’ Persian Wars, in O XFORD READINGS IN T HUCYDIDES
168–69 (Jeffrey S. Rusten ed., 2009).
57 See AMNON KABATCHNIK, BLOOD ON THE STAGE: 480 B.C. TO 1600 A.D. 4 (2014).
The Persians is the first play in recorded history that contains a ghost scene. Id.
58 STONE, supra note 48, at 51 (quoting 2 AESCHYLUS, PLAYS).
59 Id.
52
53
54
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for themselves, not for a master.60 It is for the same reason that
it takes many hunting dogs to catch one fox: The fox works
harder because he is self-employed.
The countries of the world were slow to learn this lesson.
When the United States began its experiment with democracy, it
was also slow to learn. It took nearly two centuries before we
broadly embraced the principle that free speech and the right to
dissent are essential for a free people, even in wartime. The road
to the modern legal protections was not straight and narrow.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whom the liberals of his day
idolized, did free speech no favor with his advocacy of the “clear
and present danger” test. In fact, the Supreme Court has typically
used the “clear and present danger” test to uphold a criminal
prosecution of speech.61 In contrast, the modern Court now follows
the path that Pericles and the Greek philosophers first walked.
While there will always be those who call for prosecutions of
those who spew hate, history has taught us that the best
response for the speech we do not like is more speech, not less.
How we moved from the “clear and present danger” test to the
modern, more robust protection for hate speech and political
dissent offers an important historical lesson. This lesson is
important, not only because it tells us how we reached the
contemporary view, but also reveals why our journey was so slow.
When we understand the rationale to protect hateful speech, we
will be less likely to repeat the mistakes of the past.
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The Framers were conversant with the Greek philosophers
as well as the classical Roman and European philosophers. 62
Reflecting the political theories of the ancients, the Framers created
the “separation of powers” by dividing power between the states and
the federal government (vertical separation), and among three
branches of the federal government (horizontal separation).63
The original Constitution created the various branches of the
central government and divided power between the central
Id.
As Justice Douglas’s concurrence explained in Brandenburg v. Ohio, “My own
view is quite different. I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear
and present danger’ test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling
as the Court in Dennis rephrased it.” 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
62 See generally C ARL J. R ICHARD , G REEKS & R OMANS B EARING G IFTS : HOW THE
ANCIENTS INSPIRED THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2008).
63 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Vertical Federalism, the New States’ Rights, and the
Wisdom of Crowds, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 307, 307–08 (2016).
60
61
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government and the states––those were the structural protections.
Other than these structural safeguards, the Framers imposed few
direct limitations on the government. The original Constitution
guarantees only a few important rights. It prohibits any religious test
for any office—state or federal64—a restriction that was very
progressive for its time. The original Constitution also guarantees the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases.65 It prohibits Congress from
suspending the right of habeas corpus, or from enacting any ex post
facto law or bill of attainder.66 It also forbids states from enacting any
bill of attainder or ex post facto law. 67 To protect reasonable
expectations, the original Constitution forbids states from impairing
the obligation of contracts.68 Yet, it had no bill of rights.
When the Framers lobbied the people urging them to approve
the new Constitution, many were concerned that the structural
protections of federalism and the few direct limits in the
Constitution were not enough. They feared that the government
could use its powers to restrict freedoms that the people assumed
to exist but to which the Constitution did not refer.69
For example, the body of the Constitution does not give the
central government any power to regulate the press or speech.
However, Congress does have the power to declare war,70 and the
President has the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. 71 Congress, when the nation is at war, has the
power to wage war effectively. The Necessary and Proper Clause
augments these express powers with implied powers—the power
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”72 Could Congress
use the war power to limit free speech in time of war? Prohibiting
criticism of a war by people within the United States may make it
easier to conduct a more effective war against foreign enemies.
Because the proposed Constitution had few limits, some
people who favored it were worried that it did not explicitly grant

See U.S. CONST . art. VI, cl. 3.
See id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
66 See id.; id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2–3.
67 See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2–3; id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
68 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
427–28 (1934) (explaining that the Contract Clause was adopted to give predictability to the
business of society).
69 See infra.
70 See U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
71 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
72 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause greatly increases federal power by authorizing
implied powers. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418–20 (1819).
64
65
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more protections. The Framers responded to these pressures by
promising that once the Constitution went into effect, the first
Congress would propose a Bill of Rights. 73 The politicians
actually kept their promise: The first Congress under the new
Constitution promptly proposed, on September 25, 1789, what we
now call the Bill of Rights.74 It granted more individual freedoms,
though these rights did not limit the states until after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.75
The Bill of Rights gave us the First Amendment, protecting
freedom of speech and press. 76 Some modern constitutions have
provisions that suspend constitutional rights in times of public
danger. For example, the South African Constitution, which
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has praised,77 devotes 970 words to
an article dedicated to suspending rights, including free speech. 78
There is a table of “non-derogable rights,” but free speech is not
one of them.79 In contrast, the First Amendment speaks in
broader terms: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”80 There is no provision for
suspending any rights.
IV. THE EARLY FIRST AMENDMENT—FROM THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY TO WORLD WAR I
The first test of the Free Speech Clause was the ill-fated
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Congress enacted those laws in

See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 768–69 (1928).
See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 1776–1791, at
214–15 (1955).
75 See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the
Bill of Rights only applies to the United States government); see also 2 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 14.2 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state
governments until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment).
76 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Egypt’s Constitutional Do-Over: This Time Around,
Take a Closer Look at America’s Bill of Rights, WALL ST . J. (July 17, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323740804578601383340547860.
78 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 37.
79 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Model, Resource, or Outlier? What Effect has the U.S.
Constitution had on the Recently Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?, Panel Discussion
hosted by the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 11, 2012), in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, May 17,
2013, at 12, 15, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlierwhat-effect-has-the-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations
[http://perma.cc/5F2R-MNAT]. “Consider the South African constitution. The title of Article 37
is ‘States of Emergency.’ This one article, dedicated to suspending rights under various
circumstances, is 970 words long. This one article is more than [twenty] percent of the length of
the entire U.S. Constitution of 1787. Article 37 has a table of ‘non-derogable rights.’
Free speech is not one of those.” Id. (emphasis in original).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
73
74
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an effort to squelch criticism of President Adams.81 No cases
reached the Supreme Court, but there were lower court
prosecutions involving the Sedition Act. At this early time in
American history, the restrictions that the language of the First
Amendment imposed (“Congress shall make no law”), appeared
to be as effective as chains made of parchment.
Under the Alien Act, the President could order all aliens “as
he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States” to leave the country.82 The President never formally
invoked this law, and it expired after two years, but its existence
did result in some aliens leaving the country or going into hiding.83
Its companion law, the Sedition Act, prohibited “publishing any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of Congress . . . or
the President . . . with intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into
contempt or disrepute . . . .”84 In spite of these prohibitions, the law
was relatively tolerant for its time: It allowed the defendant to use
truth as a defense to a prosecution; and it gave the defendant a jury
trial; and it authorized the jury to determine the law and facts
under the direction of the court.85
In contrast, England did not establish a defense of truth
until 1843.86 Before that, supporters of sedition laws argued,
“[t]he greater the truth, the greater the libel.”87 The fact that the
criticism was true made it more dangerous, because people are
more likely to believe the truth. Truthful criticism is more likely
to undermine government authority.88 Moreover, if you say
something is true, you cannot retract it without lying. Our
sedition law, measured against the English prohibitions, was
moderately enlightened for its time.
President Adams used the Sedition Act against members of
Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party for their
81 See Alien and Sedition Acts, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/alien-and-sedition-acts [http://perma.cc/TEV4-BKAR].
82 Alien Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570–71 (1798).
83 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.5 (5th ed. 2012).
84 Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
85 Id. § 3.
86 See Libel Act 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (Eng.); see also 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 383 (London, MacMillan and Co. 1883).
England did allow the jury to return a general verdict during this period. See Fox’s Libel Act
1792, 32 Geo. 3, c. 60.
87 2 HENRY SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY AND OTHER
SUBJECTS 516 (Fac. of L. Nw. Univ. ed., 1921). This maxim is typically attributed to Lord
Mansfield, William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
PROVERBS 136 (Jennifer Speake ed., 2003).
88 See id.
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criticism of his administration.89 Jefferson objected to the
Sedition Act, but his actions were hardly a paean to free speech. 90
When he assumed the presidency, he urged his supporters to use
state laws, rather than federal law, to keep the press in line. 91
Thus, he pressed the Governor of Pennsylvania to institute a
“few [selected] prosecutions” of those newspapers who attacked
the Jeffersonians.92
The First Amendment’s protections, initially, were chains
made of parchment because the federal government enforced the
Sedition Act, although no case involving the Sedition Act ever
worked its way to the Supreme Court. Historians today agree
that this law would not survive constitutional scrutiny.
The Sedition Act “crystallized a national awareness of the
central meaning of the First Amendment.”93 After the Sedition Act
expired,94 a different Congress enacted a law to repay the fines that
the government had levied against violators of the Sedition Act,
because it considered the law unconstitutional.95 When Thomas
Jefferson became President, he pardoned those whom courts had
convicted and sentenced under the Act. He said, “I discharged every
person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law,
because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as
absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down
and worship a golden image . . . .”96
Decades later, on February 4, 1836, Senator Calhoun, speaking
to the U.S. Senate, said that the unconstitutionality of the Sedition
Act was a matter “which no one now doubts.”97 Over the years,
various Justices, in case law98 or their other writings,99 have

89 LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 58–59
(Ivan R. Dee, Inc. ed., Elephant Paperbacks 1989) (1963).
90 See id.
91 See e.g., Ryan Mattimore, Presidential Feuds With the Media Are Nothing New,
History (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/presidents-relationship-with-press.
92 LEVY, supra note 89.
93 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
94 The Act, by its own terms, expired in 1801. Sedition Act, ch. 74, §4, 1 Stat. 597 (1798).
95 See Act of July 4, 1840, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 802; H.R. REP. NO. 26-86, at 2 (1840).
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS BIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS,
MESSAGES, A DDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, O FFICIAL AND PRIVATE 555–56 (H. A.
Washington ed., 1854).
97 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (quoting S. REP. NO. 24-122, at 3 (1836)).
98 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by
Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288–89 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
99 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 47 (Doubleday and Co. 1958).
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volunteered that this law violated the First Amendment. Classical
constitutional law commentators came to a similar conclusion.100
After the sad experience of the enforcement of the Sedition
Law, there was little activity raising free speech issues until
World War I. The federal government, particularly during the
Civil War, 101 occasionally tried to punish critical speech, but the
Supreme Court had no important role to play.102 That all changed
with America’s entry into World War I. The Supreme Court came
out of hibernation.
V. THE BIRTH OF SHOUTING “FIRE” IN A CROWDED THEATRE:
WORLD WAR I AND ITS AFTERMATH
The politicians of the early twentieth century forgot our
experience with the Alien and Sedition Acts of the early
eighteenth century. Congress, in response to the domestic
political unrest that greeted America’s entrance into World War
I, passed the Espionage Act of 1917103 and the Sedition Act of
1918.104 These laws did not respect the right to dissent in time of
war. Cases that the government brought under this legislation
reached the Supreme Court for the first time.105 The Court then
developed standards for approaching First Amendment rights at
a time when the nation was at war. The climate was not
conducive to any expansive reading of the free speech guarantee.
The Court, like the politicians, forgot the Greek philosophers and
the historical lessons of the Alien and Sedition Acts.

100 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN UNION 899–900 (8th
ed., Carrington, 1927); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 17–28 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1954) (1941).
101 See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and the Anti-War Speech in the
Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (1998) (discussing the arrest by Union soldiers of
Clement L. Vallandigham, a former Democratic congressman, because of his anti-war
speech of May 1, 1863). Vallendigham said the purpose of the war was not to save the Union
but to free the slaves and sacrifice liberty to “King Lincoln.” Id. at 123. That arrest started a
debate about the role of free speech in time of war. Vallandigham sued for release under
habeas corpus, but the Supreme Court said it had no jurisdiction to issue the writ to a
military commission. See Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253 (1863).
102 See Alexis Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870–1915,
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 64 (1980); see also David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its
Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 516, 581–82 (1981); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1227–29 (1983); Howard Owen
Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from
1791–1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 72–73 (1986); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1999).
103 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
104 Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1920).
105 See generally Marcie K. Cowley, Red Scare, FIRST A MEND . ENCYCLOPEDIA ,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1063/red-scare [http://perma.cc/7K7B-T36F].
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In 1919, the Supreme Court handed down two important
decisions involving free speech issues, Schenck v. United States 106
and Abrams v. United States.107 In the first case, the Court
introduces the “clear and present danger” test.108 In both, the
Court denied any protection for speech. 109
A.

Schenck v. United States: Shouting Fire in a Theatre
In Schenck, the Court affirmed the defendants’ conviction for
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917.110 The year was
1919. The great Red Scare (later called the first Red Scare) had
begun, reacting to Communist successes in Russia and Eastern
Europe.111 Feeding this fear were bomb-throwing anarchists, plus
the growing popularity of the Industrial Workers of the World 112
(an international radical industrial labor organization). In
January 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer launched a
gigantic two-year Red witch-hunt, complete with mass arrests
without benefit of habeas corpus, hasty prosecutions, and mass
deportation of Communists and other radicals.113
However, the Schenck defendants harangued no crowd,
threw no bombs, and made no threats.114 Instead, they merely
mailed leaflets to men eligible for military service, and argued
that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment, which
prohibits involuntary servitude (slavery).115 These leaflets, the
government argued, violated the Espionage Act, which prohibited
obstruction of military recruiting.116
Nowadays, we think of Justice Holmes’s opinions as a hymn
to free speech. He was the darling of the liberals of his day, and
the perception that he believed in free speech was a major reason
for his popularity.117 Ironically, Justice Holmes was a Social
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
109 Id. at 52–53; Abrams, 250 U.S. 623–24.
110 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53.
111 See Cowley, supra note 105.
112 See Industrial Workers of the World, E NCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (last
updated June 15, 2015), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Industrial-Workers-of-the-World
[http://perma.cc/B5HW-4RQZ].
113 See, e.g., 2 A LFRED H. K ELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON , T HE A MERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 690 (4th ed. 1970).
114 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–51.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Elizabeth R. Purdy, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., F IRST A MEND .
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1337/oliver-wendell-holmes-jr
[http://perma.cc/A66L-GAU2] (“[Justice Holmes] was viewed as a civil libertarian who
protected the First Amendment from encroachments, particularly during World War I and
the period of hostility to dissent that followed the war.”).
106
107
108
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Darwinist—a cynical believer in the survival of the fittest.118 He
did not believe in progressive taxation, or social reform, or in
antitrust enforcement. Although he fought in the Civil War and
had an abolitionist background, the plight of black people did not
move him.119 Justice Holmes was “an atheist, a materialist, a
behaviorist and a resolute enemy of natural law.”120
Only seven months before the parties argued the Schenck
case before the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes shared an
interesting train ride with Judge Learned Hand, which
resulted in them exchanging correspondence. 121 In his letter of
June 24, 1918, Justice Holmes actually declared to Judge
Learned Hand:
[F]ree speech stands no differently than freedom of vaccination. The
occasions would be rarer when you cared enough to stop it but if for any
reason you did care enough you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion
that you were acting on a provisional hypothesis and might be wrong.122

The following year, Justice Holmes, writing for the Schenck
Court, upheld the convictions and the restraint on freedom of
expression.123 He claimed that the convictions were necessary to
prevent grave and immediate threats to national security. 124
Ordinarily, Justice Holmes believed, leaflets should be
constitutionally protected, but—
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it
is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect
a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does
not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that
may have all the effect of force. The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree.125

118 See generally Seth Vannatta, Justice Holmes the Social Darwinist, 4 P LURALIST
78 (2019).
119 See id. at 81, 89.
120 See Richard A. Posner, Bookshelf: Star of the Legal Stage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1989, at A9.
121 See Frederic R. Kellogg, Learned Hand and the Great Train Ride, 56 AM. SCHOLAR
471, 480–81 (1987).
122 Id.; see also DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1870–1920,
at 293 (Arthur McEvoy & Christopher Tomlins eds., 1997).
123 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919).
124 Id. at 52.
125 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Justice Holmes concluded that First Amendment protection
should not protect speech that hindered the war effort.126 That
presents a “clear and present danger.”127
Justice Holmes’s conclusion does not flow from his hypothetical,
which we should examine in detail. He said:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.128

We should ask, why not? Notice that Justice Holmes limits the
prosecution to the speaker who is speaking falsely. That is his only
limitation, and it certainly makes sense. If there really is a fire in a
theatre, should we not tell others about it? Or, do we quietly head
for the exits and let others burn? There surely is nothing wrong in
truthfully warning the theatre audience that there is a fire, even if
many people injure themselves while trying to escape.
The alternative would be to forbid people from warning others
about fire. If that were the law, fire alarms would be illegal. Hence,
the speaker can truthfully shout fire in a crowded theater. Justice
Holmes seems to assume that, even though shouting of fire will
cause the same panic. That is the only restriction he imposes on his
famous hypothetical—that the speaker is speaking falsely.
Let us consider his facile hypothetical a bit further. What if
the speaker is speaking falsely but he does not know that it is
false? The speaker, reasonably believing that there is a fire, will
126 Id. One week after Justice Holmes wrote the Schenck opinion, he wrote two other
opinions for the Court affirming convictions in similar cases. In Frohwerk v. United
States, he stated:
[T]he First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as
such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language . . . Whatever might be thought of the other
counts on the evidence, if it were before us, we have decided in Schenck
v. United States, that a person may be convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct
recruiting by words of persuasion.
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (emphasis removed).
In Debs v. United States, Justice Holmes also affirmed the conviction of Eugene
Debs, a prominent Socialist of the time, for allegedly encouraging listeners to obstruct the
recruiting service. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). Justice Holmes in this case spoke more in
common law speech terms, which the Court (but not Justice Holmes) later adopted in
Abrams and Gitlow, discussed below. Justice Holmes said in the Debs case:
We should add that the jury were most carefully instructed that they could not
find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words
used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct
the recruiting service, & c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to
do so in his mind.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Paul Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech,
19 NEW REPUBLIC 13 (1919) (reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 239 (1973)); Harry
Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition: Professor Ernst Freund
and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI . L. REV. 235, 236–38, 240 (1973).
127 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
128 Id.
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therefore shout a warning. The speaker shouting falsely (but
reasonably) is not lying—not acting with scienter. Even if there
is a panic, the government will not punish the person who acts
reasonably in warning his fellow theatregoers.
Let us turn to the portion of Justice Holmes’s hypothetical
where there is a panic. Justice Holmes does not say that the
speaker knows that he will be causing a panic. Yet, even if Justice
Holmes meant to impose that limitation—that the speaker is
knowingly causing a panic—that knowledge should not cause
liability if the person acts quite reasonably in warning fellow
theatregoers even though the particular warning happens to be
incorrect. We install fire alarms so that people can warn others
without the need to shout, and we do not punish them if they act
reasonably in triggering the alarm.
Justice Holmes’s hypothetical does not provide, but must
assume, that the theatre audience believes the speaker is speaking
the truth, even if the speaker is speaking falsely. Assume, for
example, that the ushers were removing a member of the audience
because he was unruly and talking too loudly. The rest of the
audience might cheer the miscreant as he is escorted to the exits. If
this troublemaker starts shouting, “invasion,” “fire,” “flood,” the
audience would laugh as the ushers escort him to the exits. The
miscreant was knowingly and falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theater, but he would not be prosecuted for starting a riot because
there would be no panic.
Now assume the speaker knowingly and falsely shouts fire in
the crowded theatre, but there is no panic because of the
circumstances. For example, if the audience was watching a play
or movie, and an actor shouted “fire,” there would be no panic
because the audience would not believe the speaker even if he
had the acting ability of Meryl Streep.
If several members of the audience—perhaps they were
inattentive because it was a boring play—misunderstood and
thought that the voice shouting fire was someone in the audience,
and subsequently panicked, we still would not prosecute the actor
who was simply playing his part. Think of the “War of the Worlds”
radio broadcast of Orson Welles. Many of the people who tuned in
after the show began to think that the Martians were really
invading New Jersey.129 There were no prosecutions of Orson
Welles although many people were upset with him.130

129 See A. BRAD SCHWARTZ , BROADCAST HYSTERIA : ORSON WELLES’S WAR OF THE
WORLDS AND THE ART OF FAKE NEWS 3–7 (2015).
130 See id. at 131–35.
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Justice Holmes’s “fire in the theatre” hypothetical has another
important (and unarticulated) qualifier that is not present in his
conclusion about speech hindering the war effort. The hypothetical
assumes that there is no time for others to respond to someone who
falsely shouts “fire.” We cannot normally debate the issue as to
whether there is a fire because there is no time for debate. The
circumstances are not conducive to the give and take of normal
conversation. A fire alarm is not a call to debate. Yet, there was
plenty of time to debate the assertion of the Schenck defendants
that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment.
It is not difficult to imagine a situation where there was time
to debate, even in the “shout fire” hypothetical. A member of the
audience shouts “fire,” while pointing to smoke in a corner of the
stage. An actor on the stage responds, “No need to worry; that’s
just smoke from dry ice, which the magician will use in the next
act.” The audience, already rising from their chairs, sits down,
waits for the next act, and wonders how the magician will use a
solid form of carbon dioxide in a magic trick.
The “shouting fire” hypothetical necessarily assumes that there
is no time for responsive speech. Yet, often there is time. Modern
courts often say that the best remedy for speech that we do not like
is more speech, not enforced silence.131 In the free marketplace of
ideas, we can use speech to persuade others to reject the false
speech. Justice Holmes’s hypothetical unavoidably assumes that
there is no time for the marketplace of ideas to work. In the right
circumstances, shouting the knowingly false words will cause a
panic, and there will be no time to debate the shouter. In that
factual situation, falsely pulling the fire alarm is not a call to
discuss the nature of fire.
The state may punish someone who knowingly triggers a false
fire alarm with the intent of causing a panic, thereby causing a
panic, but there will be no punishment or a substantially less severe
one if no one hears the alarm because there will be no panic. That is
also true in the Justice Holmes’s “shouting fire” hypothetical. If the
audience were composed of deaf people watching a movie with
closed captions, and our hypothetical malefactor sneaks into the
theatre and shouts “fire,” there will be no panic. Whatever one
might prosecute this reprobate for, causing a riot will not be one of
the counts because there will be no riot. Justice Holmes’s
hypothetical should be assuming that the audience is ripe to hear
the words and act on them before anyone can counteract the speech.
We are talking about the language of incitement. Merely knowingly
shouting falsely is not enough.
131

See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
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Now, let us think of the speech involved in Schenck—where
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion upholding the criminal
prosecution. 132 The defendants opposed the war, but speeches
that oppose war do not fit the hypothetical. Those speeches are
not like falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre knowing
that the audience will panic instinctively, because there is no
time to reason with them.
The speech in Schenck—or more precisely, the leaflets that
the defendants mailed to men eligible for military service—could
not cause a panic, yet Justice Holmes upheld the convictions.
Those who object to the war protestors can engage them and
dispute them in the marketplace of ideas. There was plenty of
time for proponents of the draft to respond to the claims of those
opposed to the war. There was not even a claim that the
defendants were lying about anything. They believed what they
were saying and thus did not have the scienter to lie knowingly.
They were also not inciting anyone in the sense that the
rabble-rouser harangues the lynch mob, goading, provoking, or
prodding the willing crowd to storm the jail immediately.
In addition, Justice Holmes’s hypothetical does not require that
the speech be inherently connected with an act that is
independently criminal. For example, Justice Holmes was not
talking about a spy who informs the enemy how to break a
top-secret code. That is speech tied in with an illegal action (aiding
the enemy in time of war), and one could not rely on the
marketplace of ideas to counteract the secret actions of a spy.
Similarly, when someone takes an oath to tell the truth and then
perjures himself on a material matter, he is not merely talking but
he is using his words to engage in the act of obstructing justice. 133
Or, if the bank robber passes a note to the teller saying, “This is a
stick-up,” the writing is connected to an act, an attempted theft.
B.

Abrams v. United States
In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, Justice
Holmes again embraced his “clear and present danger” test and
tried to explain its application.134 This time, Justice Holmes
See generally Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720–21 (2012) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality
opinion). As Justice Kennedy explained:
It is not simply because perjured statements are false that they lack First
Amendment protection. Perjured testimony “is at war with justice” because it
can cause a court to render a “judgment not resting on truth.” Perjury
undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the integrity of
judgments that are the basis of the legal system.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 734–38 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring).
134 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
132
133
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finally supported free speech but he could not persuade the
majority to overturn the guilty verdicts.135 The government
convicted the defendants of conspiracy to violate the Espionage
Acts amendments,136 which prohibited speech that encouraged
resistance to the war effort and curtailment of production “with
intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States
in the prosecution of the war . . . .”137 At the time, we were at war
against Germany, but these war protestors were not objecting to
the war against Germany. Instead, they distributed pamphlets
criticizing the United States’ involvement in the effort to crush
Russia’s new communist government.138
The government was creative in explaining how the efforts of the
United States in involving itself in Russia’s civil war had anything to
do with the war against Germany.139 The prosecutors used a chain of
inferences that reminds us of the nursery rhyme, “This is the house
that Jack built.” The actual statute involved forbade conspiracies to
interfere with production of “things necessary to the prosecution of
war” with the intent to hinder the prosecution of the war.140 The
theory of the trial court and the Supreme Court majority was that to
reduce arms production for the Russian fight might aid Germany
(with whom the United States was at war) because the United States
would have fewer total arms.141 The Court did not require any
specific intent by the defendants.142
The majority in Abrams rejected the free speech defense and
was unimpressed with Justice Holmes’s clear and present danger
test.143 Because of the “bad tendency” of the defendants’ speech,
the Court upheld the convictions, even though the lower court
had sentenced the defendants to lengthy prison terms of twenty
years.144 Under the majority’s use of the bad tendency test, the
government could prohibit speech if it could tend to bring about
harmful results.
Justice Holmes argued that it was ridiculous to assume
these pamphlets would actually hinder the government’s war
See id. at 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 623–24.
137 Espionage Act of 1970, ch. 30, sec. 3, 40 Stat. 21 (as amended May 16, 1918 at ch.
75, §3, 40 Stat. 553) (repealed 1948).
138 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–25 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 624–26 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 622.
142 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
143 See id. at 621 (“Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the
effects which their acts were likely to produce.”). The free speech defense was very briefly
dismissed as “sufficiently discussed and is definitely negatived in Schenck . . .” and other
cases. Id. at 619.
144 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135
136
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efforts in Germany, which is what the statute required.145 He
then quickly moved beyond the language of the statute to
consider the constitutional issues. Holmes contended that the
government could only restrict freedom of expression when there
was “present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about . . . Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the
mind of the country.”146
Laws regulating free speech, Justice Holmes conceded, would
be an effective way for the government to stifle opposition, but he
maintained hope that people would realize that:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . . That . . . is the theory of our Constitution.147

Justice Holmes warned against overzealous repression of
unpopular ideas:
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country.148

Still, he hardly embraced any robust restriction on government
power over speech:
[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by
an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger
that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or
have any appreciable tendency to do so. Publishing those opinions for the
very purpose of obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger and
at any rate would have the quality of an attempt. So I assume that the
second leaflet if published for the purposes alleged in the fourth count
might be punishable.149

Under Justice Holmes’s utilitarian theory, we are left to
wonder why the government must wait until the dangers of the
plan are immediate. If one can punish such speech if it is successful,
would it not be better to nip the problem in the bud? Justice Holmes
himself concedes, “Publishing those opinions for the very purpose of
obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger and at any
rate would have the quality of an attempt.”150

145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 626–27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 626–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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If the government can prosecute if the danger becomes greater,
why wait until it is a greater danger? Justice Holmes’s rationale
does not explain (to turn to the fire analogy, once again) why the
firefighters should wait until the little blaze becomes a big fire
before trying to squelch it. If the danger is very great, such as the
danger of a forcible overthrow of the government, should we not nip
it in the bud? Why wait until the revolutionaries have advanced
from pistols to Howitzers? If a speaker is haranguing a crowd, and
the crowd seems uninterested, is that not the best time to take
down the speaker, before the crowd gets bigger and when it is not
absorbed with radical ideas?
C.

The Gitlow Decision
Six years after Abrams, the Court continued to use the “bad
tendency test” to uphold restrictions on free speech. State prosecutors
convicted defendants in Gitlow v. New York, of violating New York’s
“criminal anarchy statute.”151 This law prohibited advocating for a
violent overthrow of the government.152 Defendants had printed and
circulated a radical manifesto encouraging political strikes.153 There
was no evidence that the manifesto had any effect on the individuals
who received copies.154 The manifesto was unpersuasive.155
The majority of the Gitlow Court once again upheld the
conviction and the statute, finding the “clear and present danger”
test inapplicable. The Court reasoned that the clear and present
danger test applies when a statute prohibiting particular acts
does not include any restrictions on the use of language.156 Only
then, the majority argued, should a court use the “clear and
present danger” test to determine if the particular speech is
constitutionally protected.157 In such a case, where the statute
does not ban speech directly, the government must prove the
defendants’ language brought about the statutorily prohibited
result.158 However, Gitlow noted that the legislature had already
determined what utterances would violate the statute.159 The
government’s decision that certain words are likely to cause the
substantive evil “is not open for consideration.”160 The government
must then show only that there is a reasonable basis for the

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1925).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655–56.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 670.
Id.
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statute. It is irrelevant that the particular words do or do not
create a “clear and present danger.”161
Justice Holmes dissented. He argued that if the “clear and
present danger” test were properly applied, it would be obvious
there was no real danger that the defendants’ pamphlets would
instigate political revolution. 162 If the manifesto presented an
immediate threat to the stability of the government, then there
would be a need for suppression. 163 In the absence of immediate
danger, Justice Holmes concluded, the defendants were entitled
to exercise their First Amendment rights.
Yet, Justice Holmes once again appeared to concede that the
government could limit speech if the speaker is convincing. He
would protect the defendants in this case because their “redundant
discourse . . . had no chance of starting a present conflagration.”164
The Constitution, it would seem, only protects boring speakers.
Persuasive speakers are fair game for criminal prosecution under
Justice Holmes’s rationale.
If the government may limit speech when it becomes persuasive,
why wait? The government should be able to stop the problem at its
source. Justice Holmes’s rationale for the “clear and present danger ”
test suggests that the state can crush dissent when people start to
believe in it (a “present” danger). If that is true, one might think that
the state should not have to wait—just like firefighters should not
wait to act until the brushfire becomes a barnburner.
D. Whitney, Justice Brandeis, and the Influence of Pericles
In the Court’s 1927 decision, Whitney v. California,165 the “clear
and present danger ” test made its appearance yet again, and this
time at least it was in a concurrence, rather than a dissent. Still, it
did not protect the defendant. In fact, when Justice Holmes was on
the Court, it never used the “clear and present danger” test to
overturn any conviction.
The government convicted Ms. Whitney of violating the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act by assisting in the organization
of the Communist Labor Party of California.166 The statute defined
criminal syndicalism as any doctrine “advocating, teaching or aiding

161
162
163
164
165
166

See id.
Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Id. at 360–64.
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and abetting . . . crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and
violence” to effect political or economic change.167
Ms. Whitney said that she attended the organizing convention
to advocate for political reform through the democratic process.168
The majority of the Court, however, disagreed with her and found
that she supported change through violence and terrorism.169 She
maintained that she had not assisted the Communist Party with
knowledge of its illegal purpose. The state based her conviction on
her mere presence at the convention.170
The Court held that the jury had resolved adversely to Ms.
Whitney important factual questions, concluding that (1) she had
participated at the convention, (2) the united action of the
Communist Party threatened the welfare of the state, and (3) she
was a part of that organization. 171 That was enough for the
majority, and they affirmed her conviction. 172
What is significant about Whitney is Justice Brandeis’s
concurring opinion. Justice Brandeis labeled his opinion
“concurring,” but it reads like a dissent. His technical reason for
affirming the conviction (Ms. Whitney did not specifically raise the
“clear and present danger” test), was probably a ploy or stratagem.
The Justices can call their opinions whatever they want. He likely
wanted his opinion to carry more authority for future Justices, and
an opinion called “concurring” should carry more weight than a
dissent, which is, by definition, not precedent. Justice Brandeis
understood that the Supreme Court had not yet used Justice
Holmes’s clear and present danger test to overturn a free speech
conviction. If the Court used it at all, it only did so to affirm a
conviction. (Justice Brandeis did not know it yet, but the Supreme
Court would never use the clear and present danger test to overturn
a state or federal conviction based on criminal syndicalism.)
Justice Brandeis’s opinion, which Justice Holmes joined,
upheld the conviction only on a narrow procedural ground.173 More
importantly, he offered a rationale for free speech that was much
more principled than Justice Holmes’s rationale. It did not adopt
Justice Holmes’s concession that the government could not ban
boring speech but could ban persuasive speech. One fatal flaw in
Justice Holmes’s reasoning is that, by conceding that the
government can punish persuasive speech, he allowed the
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 359.
See id. at 367.
Id. at 367–68.
Id.
See id. at 367–72.
Id. at 372.
See id. at 372–74 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
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government to respond that it should be able to thwart the problem
early, by banning the same speech before it becomes persuasive.
The First Amendment does not protect much if it only protects the
speaker engaged in a “redundant discourse,” who has “no chance of
starting a present conflagration.”174
Justice Brandeis, first, specifically objected to any notion, first
presented in Gitlow, that the enactment of a statute foreclosed the
application of the clear and present danger test by the Court. 175
Then he proceeded to justify the right of free speech even for those
who protest a war or advocate communism or similar doctrines.
To do that, he adopted the rationale of Herodotus, Thucydides,
Pericles, and Aeschylus, nearly two and one-half millennia earlier.
Justice Brandeis focused on “incitement.”176
Justice Brandeis argued that the state does not ordinarily
have “the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and
political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to
be false and fraught with evil consequence.”177 That is because
the Framers “valued liberty both as an end and as a means.” 178
Those who drafted the First Amendment “believed liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.”179
His words mirrored similar sentiments in the funeral oration of
Pericles, who said that we should regard “courage to be freedom
and freedom to be happiness . . . .”180
Justice Brandeis also argued that free speech does not
undermine, but rather secures public order: “[R]epression breeds
hate; . . . hate menaces stable government; . . . the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies . . . . ”181 That argument channeled Pericles
who said, “The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not
discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by
discussion preparatory to action.”182

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring) (“[T]he
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essential to its
validity.”); see also SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 161–71 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983).
176 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
178 Id. (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
180 1 PERICLES, THUCYDIDES 116, 122 (B. Jowett trans., Clarendon Press, 1881).
181 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
182 1 PERICLES, supra note 180, at 119 (emphasis added).
174
175
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Justice Brandeis’s concurrence emphasized that the
government must prove incitement—an unthinking, Pavlovian
response from the audience:
[E]ven advocacy of [law] violation, however, reprehensible morally, is
not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on . . . [N]o danger flowing from speech
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion.183

The government cannot ban speech that “falls short of
incitement.”184 Only when speech is in a context that it causes
unthinking, immediate action is the rationale for the protection
of the First Amendment withdrawn. That is because when the
speaker incites the crowd—for example, the leader incites a lynch
mob, or the man knowingly and falsely shouts fire in a crowded
theater knowing that the crowd will listen to him and believe
him— there is no opportunity for full discussion. There is no way
to counter the speech we do not like by presenting more speech.
Justice Brandeis concluded that in situations where the rights
of free speech and assembly were infringed, the defendant might
contest this suppression alleging a violation of free speech.
Instead, Ms. Whitney had challenged her conviction on the basis of
a denial of due process; therefore, Justice Brandeis said that he
was unable to pass on the free speech issue.185 This technicality
meant that Justice Brandeis was able to call his opinion a
concurrence, thus lending it more authority for future citations.
Justice Brandeis’s plea for toleration fell on deaf ears. Recall that
during the second Red Scare, in the 1950s, the federal government
once again prosecuted those who advocated anarchy, communism,
and social unrest.186 Recall also that Justice Frankfurter, concurring
in Dennis v. United States,187 thought that—unlike in Justice
Brandeis’s day—there is now “ample justification for a legislative
judgment that the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat to
national order and security.”188

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376–77 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
Id. (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring).
186 See Landon R. Y. Storrs, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare, OXFORD RES .
ENCYCLOPEDIA: A M. HISTORY (2015), http://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-6 [http://perma.cc/XA7A-YLFH].
187 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
188 Id. at 541–42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
183
184
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Justice Frankfurter was not alone. His factual assertions were
also “obvious” to the Dennis plurality, which upheld the conviction.
Chief Justice Vinson spoke for the plurality:
Obviously, the words [clear and present danger] cannot mean that
before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about
to be executed . . . . If Government is aware that a group aiming at its
overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members . . . action by the
Government is required . . . . Certainly an attempt to overthrow the
Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of
inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil
for Congress to prevent.189

Chief Justice Vinson said the Court must look at “the gravity
of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability.”190 The evil in this
case is the overthrow of the government. That evil is so grave
that the government may punish speech that is unlikely to be
persuasive and is far divorced from any action.
Justice Holmes used his clear and present danger test to uphold
the conviction of Mr. Schenck and his colleagues for mailing leaflets
arguing that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment.191 This
test became an even weaker protection for unpopular speech when
Chief Justice Vinson turned the test on its head. As the potential evil
becomes greater, the need for the government to move earlier is
greater, so the less clear and present the danger may be.
There was a long and winding road from Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney to the modern free speech doctrine. Rather
than retrace each step, a journey that one can take elsewhere,192 let
us move to the modern right to advance unpopular speech, to
propagate hate, and to advocate (but not engage in) violence and
other illegal conduct. The modern view rejects “clear and present
danger” and adopts a stricter test that incorporates and extends
Justice Brandeis’s rationale.
VI. THE MODERN TEST
During the late 1960s, the Court focused on protecting the
advocacy of unpopular ideas. Thus, this modern test is much more
protective of the right to dissent. It grew out of four cases decided by
the Court in the late 1960s: Bond v. Floyd,193 Watts v. United

189 Id. at 509 (Vinson, C.J., speaking for a plurality). Only Justices Black and Douglas
dissented. See id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 510 (Vinson, C.J. speaking for a plurality) (quoting United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 210 (Hand, C.J.)).
191 See supra Part V.A.
192 See generally 5 R OTUNDA & NOWAK , supra note 83, §§ 20.1–20.17.
193 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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States,194 Brandenburg v. Ohio,195 and Hess v. Indiana.196 The last
two cases, in particular, create the modern incitement test, which
requires the government to prove that the speaker both subjectively
and objectively intended to incite immediate and unthinking
lawless violence in a situation that makes this purpose likely
to be successful.197
A.

The Julian Bond Case
Mr. Julian Bond was a duly elected member of the Georgia
House of Representative.198 The other Members of the Georgia
House refused to seat him. The problem was that Mr. Bond had
publicly expressed his support of a statement issued by the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) criticizing
the “United States’ involvement in Viet Nam” and the operation
of the draft laws.199 The Georgia legislature conducted a special
hearing to determine if Mr. Bond, in good faith, could take the
mandatory oath to support the Constitution.200 At the legislative
hearing, Mr. Bond said that he was willing and able to take his
oath of office.201 He testified that he supported individuals who
burned their draft cards but, he added, he did not burn his own
nor had he counseled anyone to burn their card. 202 Nonetheless,
the Georgia House voted not to administer the oath or seat Mr.
Bond. He sued and that led to Bond v. Floyd.203
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Georgia House violated
Mr. Bond’s right of free expression.204 Although the oath of office was
constitutionally valid, Chief Justice Warren wrote, this requirement
did not empower the state representatives to challenge a duly elected
legislator’s sincerity in swearing allegiance to the Constitution.205
Such authority could be used to stifle dissents of legislators who
disagreed with majority views.206
The Court also ruled that it would be unconstitutional for
the federal government to convict Mr. Bond under the Selective
Service Act for counseling or aiding persons to evade or refuse
394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
196 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
197 See 5 R OTUNDA & NOWAK , supra note 83, § 20.15(d).
198 See Bond, 385 U.S. at 118.
199 Id. at 118–21.
200 Id. at 123.
201 Id. at 125.
202 Id. at 123–24. The Supreme Court later upheld the constitutionality of federal laws
punishing draft card burning in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968).
203 Bond, 385 U.S. at 123, 125–26.
204 Id. at 137.
205 Id. at 132.
206 See id.
194
195
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registration.207 The Court said that one could not reasonably
interpret Mr. Bond’s statements “as a call to unlawful refusal to
be drafted.”208 Mr. Bond actually appeared to be advocating legal
alternatives to the draft, not inciting people to violate the law.
The Court concluded that Mr. Bond’s punishment for these
statements violated the First Amendment.209
B.

The Watts Decision
A harbinger of the later cases is Watts v. United States.210 In
a brief, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Mr.
Watts’s conviction for violating a statute prohibiting persons from
“knowingly and willfully . . . threat[ening] to take the life of or to
inflict bodily harm upon the President . . . .”211 Mr. Watts, during a
public rally in Washington, D.C., stated he would not report for his
scheduled draft physical. Then, he referred to President Johnson
(L.B.J.) and added:
If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights
is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.212

The Court said that the statute was “constitutional on its
face,” because the nation certainly has a valid interest in
protecting the President. 213 However, the Court must interpret
this statute narrowly, so that it does not criminalize pure
speech, protected by the First Amendment. 214 “What is a threat
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
speech.”215 Mr. Watts’s statement was only “political
hyperbole” and not a “true threat.”216

Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); and Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 U.S. 1 (1949)).
210 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
211 Id. at 705.
212 Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
213 Id. at 707.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 708 (concluding that the government must “prove a true ‘threat’”); see also
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“‘True threats’ encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”). The plurality ruled that a provision of the Virginia cross burning statute,
which stated that burning a cross in public view “shall be prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate,” was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it
was not limited to “true threats.” Id. at 347–48. It is a “true threat” if “a speaker directs a
threat to a person . . . with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death.” Id. at 359–60. A “true threat” is one “where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.” Id. at 359 (emphasis added). “[S]ome cross burnings fit
within this meaning of intimidating speech and rightly so.” Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
207
208
209
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The language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and
inexact. [The defendant’s] only offense here was “a kind of very crude
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.”217

One must consider Mr. Watts’s statement in context: His
“threat” was conditional, and his listeners responded by laughing.
His words should only be interpreted as an expression of political
belief. Moreover, the circumstances of Mr. Watts’s speech did not
amount to a literal incitement of violence. If it had, the Court’s
reasoning and analysis would have been different.
The influence of the “incitement” prong of Justice Brandeis’s
concurrence in Whitney218 is evident in both Bond and Watts. The
pivotal determination in Bond was the fact that the defendant was
merely expressing his grievances with the government, not
inciting a lynch mob to unlawful action. Furthermore, the Court
reversed the defendant’s conviction in Watts because his statement
did not clearly present any imminent threat to the President.
Later, the Court clarified that a “true threat” requires not only
that the recipient of the threat believe it to be a real and serious
threat, but also that the defendant intended to issue a true threat,
had scienter, and specifically knew that the communications would be
viewed as threats.219
This leads to the two decisions that incorporate the learning
and mistakes of the past to give us the modern test—Brandenburg
v. Ohio,220 and Hess v. Indiana.221 The origins of this modern test lie
2500 years ago.
C.

The Brandenburg Test
The culmination of the modern test is found in Brandenburg
v. Ohio.222 It signaled a major shift in the Court. Many
commentators at the time did not appreciate its significance
because the Court issued its ruling in a brief per curiam opinion, 223
a designation often given to less significance opinions. The Warren
Court rejected the limited protection of the “clear and present
danger” test as Justice Holmes had advanced it, and instead
Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
219 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011–12 (2015) (holding that, in
order for the government to convict the defendant of issuing threats on Facebook, it must
prove that the defendant, with scienter, intended to issue and true threat or knew that
communications would be viewed as threats). Defendant said such things as, “if worse
comes to worse I’ve got enough explosives,” and, “hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a
Kindergarten class.” Id. at 2006.
220 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
221 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
222 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
223 Id. at 444.
217
218
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adopted crucial differences in phrasing and emphasis to assure that
its free speech protections would not be diluted.224
Instead, Brandenburg created a new test. First, it explicitly
overruled the Whitney decision.225 It did not adopt the clear and
present danger test, and never explicitly referred to it. However,
Justices Black and Douglas did: In their separate concurrences they
made clear that, “the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should
have no place in the interpretation of the First Amendment.”226
Brandenburg also added new vigor to the reasoning of Justice
Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney, and eliminated the open-ended
use of the test that had prevailed in the “bad tendency” and
“balancing” years.
The Brandenburg Court’s per curiam opinion reversed the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating Ohio’s criminal
syndicalism statute.227 Ohio charged Brandenburg with advocating
political reform through violence and assembling with a group
formed to teach criminal syndicalism.228 The facts showed that a
man identified as Brandenburg arranged for a television news crew
to attend a Ku Klux Klan rally.229 During the news film made at the
rally, Klan members, including Brandenburg, discussed the group’s
plan to march on Congress.230
The Court acknowledged that it had upheld a similar criminal
syndicalism statute in Whitney, but the Court said, later decisions
discredited Whitney.231 The Court then held that the right of free
speech protects advocacy of violence as long as the advocacy did
not incite people to imminent action.232 The key is “incitement.”
When a speaker uses speech to cause unthinking, immediate
lawless action, one cannot rely on more speech in the market place
of ideas to correct the errors of the original speech; there simply is
not enough time, because there is an incitement. In these rare
cases, the state has a significant interest in, and no other means of
preventing, the resulting lawless conduct. The situation is
comparable to someone urging the lynch mob to string up the
prisoner. Or, to apply this test to Justice Holmes’s analogy, it is akin
Id. at 450.
See id. at 449 (overturning Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)).
226 Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring); see also id. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear and present danger’
test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in
Dennis rephrased it.”).
227 Id. at 444–45.
228 See id. at 445.
229 Id.
230 See id. at 446.
231 Id. at 447.
232 Id.
224
225
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to someone (a) knowingly and falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded
theater (b) with the intent to cause a riot, in such circumstances,
(c) where there is no time for reasoned debate, because both the
intent of the speaker, his objective words, his scienter (he is
knowingly and falsely shouting), and the circumstances in which he
harangues the crowd amount to incitement.
Thus, Brandenburg developed a new, four-part test that
emphasizes the need for the state to prove incitement. For the
state conviction to be valid, the state must prove: (1) the speaker
subjectively intended incitement; (2) in context, the words used are
“likely to incite or produce” “imminent, lawless action;”233 and
(3) the words used by the speaker objectively encouraged, urged,
and (4) provoked imminent action. The Court made clear this third
part of the test, with its focus on the objective words used by the
speaker, in a later decision, Hess v. Indiana,234 discussed below.
The Brandenburg Court then summarized the new test for
speech that advocates unlawful conduct: The state may not
“forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”235 Merely teaching abstract doctrines, the Court noted,
was not like leading a group in a violent action. Moreover, the
statute must be narrowly drawn to reflect these limitations.
If the statute failed to distinguish between advocacy of a theory
and advocacy of action, it abridges First Amendment freedoms.
Criminal syndicalism, as defined in the Ohio statute, did not
pass the Brandenburg test.236 The statute forbade teaching of violent
political revolution with the intent of spreading such doctrine or
assembling with a group advocating this doctrine.237 At the
defendant’s trial, the prosecution made no attempt to distinguish
between incitement and advocacy. Thus, the Ohio statute abridged
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.238 Any law punishing mere
233 Id. at 447 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (“[A]dvocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
(emphasis added)).
234 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam); see also Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating
Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1179, 1193–94 (2005).
235 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas concurred separately
entering the caveat that there was no place for the clear and present danger test in any cases
involving First Amendment rights. Id. at 452 (Douglas, J., concurring). He was distrustful of
the test, which he believed could be easily manipulated to deny constitutional protection to any
speech critical of existing government. Id. at 451–52 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black
also concurred separately, and similarly objected to the clear and present danger test as
insufficiently protective of free speech. Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring).
236 Id. at 449.
237 See id.
238 Id. at 448–49.
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advocacy of Ku Klux Klan doctrine and the assembling of Klan
members to advocate their beliefs was unconstitutional.
Brandenburg’s new formulation offers broad, new protection for
strong advocacy. Its major focus is on the inciting language of the
speaker—that is, on the objective words. In addition, it stresses the
need to show that the speech is directed to produce immediate,
unthinking lawless action and that, in fact, the situation makes this
purpose likely to be successful.
D. Hess v. Indiana and its Vindication of Brandenburg
A post-Warren Court decision, Hess v. Indiana,239 is
significant because it demonstrates that the Court is serious and
literal in its application of the test proposed in Brandenburg.
The police arrested Mr. Hess (who was subsequently convicted) for
disorderly conduct when he shouted “we’ll take the fucking street
later (or again)” during an antiwar demonstration.240 Two
witnesses testified Mr. Hess did not appear to exhort
demonstrators to go into the street that the police had just cleared,
that he was facing the crowd, and that his tone of voice (although
loud) was no louder than any of the other demonstrators.241 The
Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that Mr.
Hess intended his remarks to incite further riotous behavior and
were likely to produce such a result.242
However, the Supreme Court reversed, and in its brief per
curiam opinion the Court stated:
At best, . . . the statement could be taken as counsel for present
moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time. This is not sufficient to
permit the State to punish Hess’[s] speech. Under our decisions, “the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”243

Because Mr. Hess’s speech was “not directed to any person or
group of persons,” he had not advocated action that would
produce imminent disorder.244 Mr. Hess’s statements, therefore,
did not violate the disorderly conduct statutes.245

239
240
241
242
243
244
245

See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
Id. at 108–09.
Id.
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Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, strongly dissented to the per curiam opinion’s
“somewhat antiseptic description of this massing” of people and
preferred to rely on the decision of the trial court, which was free
to reject some testimony and accept other testimony.246 The
majority, Justice Rehnquist claimed, was merely interpreting the
evidence differently, and thus exceeding the proper scope of
review.247 The majority was unmoved. There was some evidence
that Mr. Hess’s “statement could be taken as counsel for present
moderation” and hence his “objective words” did not meet the
requirements of Brandenburg.248
The new Brandenburg test—a test more vigorously phrased and
strictly applied than the older clear and present danger test—now is
the proper formula for determining when speech that advocates
criminal conduct may constitutionally be punished. With its
emphasis on incitement, imminent lawless action, and the objective
words of the speaker, the Brandenburg test should provide a strong
measure of First Amendment protection.
When a speaker advocates violence using speech that does
not literally incite,249 the Court should protect the speaker. The
government might urge the Court to look for proximity to
violence rather than to the literal words of incitement. However,
Brandenburg rejects that theory.250
See id. at 110–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109, 111–12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
248 See id. at 108.
249 Consider the application of this principle to those who sue the media because of
what they broadcast. A woman sued a television network and publisher for injuries
inflicted by persons whom, she alleged, were stimulated by watching a scene of brutality
broadcast in a television drama. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Niemi, 434 U.S. 1354 (1978), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), appeal after remand 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981). The
petitioners sought a stay of the state court order remanding for a trial. Id. Circuit Justice
Rehnquist denied the stay for procedural reasons, and he noted that the trial judge
rendered judgment for petitioners because he found that the film “did not advocate or
encourage violent and depraved acts and thus did not constitute an incitement.” Id. at
1356. The Brandenburg test should be applicable to determine the free speech defense to
plaintiff’s tort claim.
See also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988), which overturned a jury verdict against Hustler Magazine
arising out of the death of an adolescent who attempted sexual practice described in a
magazine article. Id. “[W]e hold that liability cannot be imposed on Hustler on the basis
that the article was an incitement to attempt a potentially fatal act without
impermissibly infringing upon freedom of speech.” Id.
250 See, for example, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982),
which declared:
The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers’[s] speeches did not
transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg. The
lengthy addresses generally contained an impassioned plea for black citizens to
unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize the political and
economic power available to them. In the course of those pleas, strong language
246
247
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E.

Brandenburg, Marc Antony, and Shouting Fire
Brandenburg’s new formulation offers broad, new protection
for strong advocacy. Its major focus is on the inciting language of
the speaker, that is, on the objective words, in addition to the
need to show that the speaker subjectively intends the speech to
produce immediate, unthinking lawless action in a situation that
makes this purpose likely to be successful.
Let us apply this test to another funeral oration, not the oration
of Pericles, but Marc Antony’s funeral oration in Shakespeare’s
Julius Caesar. Here are a few of Antony’s words:
I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.
The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interrèd with their bones;
So let it be with Caesar. The noble Brutus
Hath told you Caesar was ambitious;
If it were so, it was a grievous fault, . . .
[Caesar] was my friend, faithful and just to me,
But Brutus says he was ambitious,
And Brutus is an honourable man. . .
I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition?
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious,
And sure he is an honourable man.
I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke, . . .
My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,
And I must pause till it come back to me.251

First, we can safely assume that Antony subjectively
intended incitement. Second, in context, the words used were
likely to produce imminent, lawless action. We all know what
was used. If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial
question would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the
consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case, however--with the possible
exception of the Cox incident--the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred
weeks or months after the April 1, 1966 speech; the chancellor made no finding
of any violence after the challenged 1969 speech. Strong and effective
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases.
An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals
do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.
Id. (emphasis added).
251 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2, at 66–71, 77–79, 88–92, 98–99
(Marvin Spevack ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (1599).
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happened next: Civil War. Antony’s side won, although it was a
short-lived victory for Antony. His ally, Octavius Caesar, soon
turned against him and forced him to commit suicide.252
Still, Antony’s speech does not meet the third part of the
test—the words used by the speaker must objectively encourage,
urge, and provoke imminent action. This third part of the test,
with its focus on the speaker’s objective words, protects Antony.
He did not literally advocate violence. Indeed, he said his
opponents were “honourable” men. He did not advocate war: He
said he only spoke to bury Caesar. Thus, the ruling in
Brandenburg would protect him. And in so doing the First
Amendment protects all of us.
VII. APPLYING THE MODERN TEST TO UNDERSTAND THE
MODERN LAW
A.

Fighting Words
In the era before Brandenburg, the Court created a category
of unpopular speech that the First Amendment did not protect,
so-called “fighting words.” The first case was Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, decided in 1942, during World War II.253 The
defendant, Walter Chaplinsky, encountered the city fire marshal,
addressed him as a “God damned racketeer and a damned
fascist.”254 The Court upheld his conviction under a state statute
banning face-to-face words having “a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark
is addressed.”255 “The test,” said the Court, “is what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight.”256
We can think of the speech in Brandenburg or in Hess, as a call
for mayhem on a wholesale level. Recall that neither speech in
those cases met the strict three-part requirements of incitement
that would allow the government to intervene. The call to fight in
Chaplinsky we might compare to a call for mayhem on a retail level,
face-to-face. However, that speech hardly met the test laid out in
Brandenburg and Hess, yet the Court affirmed the conviction.
The Court indicated some discomfort with the Chaplinsky
“fighting words” test in Terminiello v. Chicago.257 In Terminiello,
the Court invalidated the defendant’s breach of the peace
252
253
254
255
256
257

See generally id.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 573.
Id.
337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949).
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conviction for denouncing Jews and others.258 However, the Court
reversed the conviction without reaching the question of whether
the speech constituted “fighting words.” Instead, the Court found
the jury instruction was in error.259 The trial judge had
instructed the jury to convict if the speech “stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or
creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the
enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.”260 Denouncing
the instruction, the Court stated that “a function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute,” and do the
other things explicitly forbidden by the jury instruction. 261 A
conviction “resting on any of those grounds [relied on in the jury
instruction] may not stand.”262
The last Supreme Court decision that embraced the “fighting
words” doctrine is now two-thirds of a century old, Feiner v. New
York.263 It spoke of a possible “fighting words” exception to free
speech—that case no longer lives with any vigor.
Feiner upheld the disorderly conduct misdemeanor conviction
of Irving Feiner, who was speaking on a street corner, calling
President Truman a “bum,” and the American Legion the “Nazi
Gestapo.”264 Some in the crowd were hostile and others favored Mr.
Feiner. After he had spoken for about a half hour urging blacks to
“rise up in arms,” the police arrested him and led him away in an
effort to prevent violent reaction.265 The Court reasoned,
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the
speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace. 266

Notice that the Court did say, as a factual matter, that Mr.
Feiner was inciting the crowd and upheld the conviction. Justices
Black, Douglas, and Minton dissented.267
Feiner was the high-water mark for the “fighting words”
doctrine. Subsequent Supreme Court cases chipped away at it
over the years.268 For example, in Gooding v. Wilson, Mr. Johnny
C. Wilson said to police officers who were attempting to restore
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268

Id. at 3, 5–6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
340 U.S. 315, 331–32 (1951).
Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 329 (Douglas, J., joined by Minton, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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order to a public building: “White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you,” and
to another: “You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me
again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.”269 The Georgia statute prohibited
“opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a
breach of the peace . . . .”270 The state standard allowed juries to
determine guilt as “measured by common understanding and
practice”271—a phrase too broad and not necessarily limited to
incitement. What the defendant said would not “tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace”272 and the Court overturned
Wilson’s conviction. 273
After Brandenburg and Hess, the Court held that the state
could not allow a tort for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because a congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church
picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God
hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality,
particularly in America’s military. 274 The offensive picketers
peacefully displayed their signs stating, for example, “Thank God
for Dead Soldiers.” 275 The Court explained, “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”276
One case in the Sixth Circuit illustrates the reluctance of
some judges to recognize the modern full-bodied protection of free
speech.277 The first opinion in that case ignored the lessons of
Brandenburg and Hess and applied the “fighting words” test to
restrict free speech.278 In the second opinion, the en banc Sixth
Circuit overturned the panel and embraced Brandenburg and Hess.
The case arose because a Christian evangelical group was
“preaching hate and denigration to a crowd of Muslims, some of
whom responded with threats of violence” during a city festival
celebrating Arab culture.279 The police responded by removing
the evangelicals, who then filed a civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C. 1983 against the sheriff and deputies, alleging that they
Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519.
271 Id. at 528.
272 Id. at 522 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(emphasis added)).
273 See id. at 520.
274 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011).
275 Id. at 448.
276 Id. at 458 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
277 See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2013 (2016).
278 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 765 F.3d 578, 597 (6th Cir. 2014) rev’d, 805 F.3d
228 (6th Cir. 2015).
279 Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 234.
269
270
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violated the evangelicals’ rights to freedom of speech, free
exercise of religion, and equal protection by cutting off their
protests.280 The trial court entered summary judgment for the
defendants, and the Sixth Circuit panel affirmed.281 But the en
banc Sixth Circuit reversed and protected the hate speech.282
The state may not silence the speaker as expedient or efficient
alternative to containing rioting individuals’ lawless behavior
because there is no right to a heckler’s veto.283 The en banc court
recognized that Feiner and “fighting words” only exist when the
speaker is engaged in incitement within the meaning of Brandenburg
and Hess.284 As the en banc Sixth Circuit makes clear:
Maintenance of the peace should not be achieved at the expense of the
free speech. The freedom to espouse sincerely held religious, political,
or philosophical beliefs, especially in the face of hostile opposition, is
too important to our democratic institution for it to be abridged simply
due to the hostility of reactionary listeners who may be offended by a
speaker’s message.285

The incantation of “fighting words” no longer offers a
justification to restrict speech. It is one thing if a speaker incites
a lynch mob—that meets the Brandenburg and Hess test—but
quite another if the speaker promotes hate speech or advocates
positions that upset the crowd, even if the crowd responds with
mayhem.286 As Bible Believers explained, in light of the present
case law, “[t]he better view of Feiner is summed up, simply, by
the following truism: when a speaker incites a crowd to violence,
his incitement does not receive constitutional protection.” 287
“Incitement” is a term of art that requires speech, plus something
else, such as inciting a lynch mob to lynch in a narrow factual
context.288 That restriction is a bequest from the ancient Greeks.
B.

Provocative Speech in Schools
Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District is a
peculiar case, because it endorses a heckler’s veto.289 This case
held that a public school could prohibit students from wearing
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 233, 242.
283 Id. at 252, 265 (overruling Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.
1975) because there is no right to a heckler’s veto).
284 Id. at 248.
285 Id. at 252.
286 Id. at 245 (quoting 5 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 83, § 20.39(a)) (noting that “[t]he
authority of Feiner has been undercut significantly in subsequent [Supreme Court] cases”).
287 Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 245.
288 See supra Part VI.E. (discussing Marc Antony’s funeral oration as an example of a
speech that does not meet the strict Brandenburg and Hess test).
289 767 F.3d 764, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2014).
280
281
282

Do Not Delete

2019]

5/29/2019 2:36 PM

The Right to Shout Fire in a Crowded Theatre

361

a symbol of the American Flag on their clothing because doing
so might upset some Mexican American students. 290 Yes, we
live in world where a public school can ban the American Flag
because it is hate speech, but the government cannot ban
burning the American Flag. 291 Those who support the decision
in Dariano explain that it was correct for the court to
“balance” the interests involved; that is only what the First
Amendment requires, we are told. 292
However, that is not what the Supreme Court ruled when it
decided a very similar issue in 1969.293 We were in the middle of the
Vietnam War, and the disputes between the hawks and doves did
not end with debates in Congress and protests in the streets. They
continued in our public high schools. The Supreme Court decision
on this issue was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District.294 Some high school students—the doves—claimed a
constitutional right to wear black armbands as a symbol to protest
the Vietnam War.295 The Court has long held that the First
Amendment protects not only words but also symbols, such as flags,
banners, pictures of donkeys and elephants.296
The principals of all of the Des Moines schools sided with the
hawks. They adopted a policy, first, to ask any student to remove
the armband protesting the war.297 If the student objected, the
school would suspend her until she returned without the
armband.298 Oddly enough, the principals imposed no ban on
students wearing national political campaigns buttons; some
students even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of
Nazism.299 However, a symbol of peace was just too much for the
schools. They had to draw the line.
The Court decided against the school district. 300 The Court
acknowledged that the nature of the students’ rights is
different because a school is not a public forum in the sense
that a public street is, however, neither students nor teachers
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
Id. at 777.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990).
292 See, e.g., Julie Hilden, A Ninth Circuit Panel Balances First Amendment Rights
Against School Safety, VERDICT (Mar. 3, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/03/03/ninthcircuit-panel-balances-first-amendment-rights-school-safety [http://perma.cc/US2G-59FT].
293 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
294 Id.
295 Id. at 504.
296 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
297 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 510–11.
300 Id. at 514.
290
291
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expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 301 For example, during a
history class about the Civil War, no student would have a
right to disrupt the lesson by asserting a right to talk about
the Vietnam War. Similarly, the geography teacher can limit
discussion to issues of geography that relate to that day’s
lesson. However, wearing black armbands (like wearing
pierced earrings) does not disrupt the education of the school.
The Tinker Court understood this distinction:
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder
or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence
whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the
schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be
secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students.302

Tinkers made clear that the students wearing armbands
protesting—the doves—were not interfering with anything. Some of
the students opposed to the doves—the hawks—were upset. A “few
students [the hawks] made hostile remarks to the children wearing
armbands,”303 but if schools were going to punish anyone, they
should punish the hawks. Tinker did not approve of any “heckler’s
veto.” If the hawks decided to beat up the doves, that would not
authorize the school to restrict the free speech of the doves.
Tinker acknowledged that any “word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.”304
Nonetheless, the “Constitution says we must take this risk,” and
our openness is “the basis of our national strength” and part of the
warp and woof of our “often disputatious” society. If the heckler is
disturbing the speaker, the law interferes to protect the speaker,
not the heckler.305
There have been a few cases since Tinker where the Supreme
Court has clarified (but not undercut) its holding. For example, a
school assembly is also not a public forum. If the school provides
for an assembly for all the students (including some as young as
fourteen years of age), where students could speak on behalf of
candidates for student government, then the school could require
the students not to engage in lewd speech. 306

301
302
303
304
305
306

Id. at 506.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508–09.
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
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If the high school students in a journalism class, under the
supervision of a teacher, publish a school newspaper, the high
school educators could exercise editorial control over the
newspaper.307 The high school student newspaper is not a public
forum; instead, it is part of a course for credit, under the
teacher’s supervision. More recently, the Court held that the
school could confiscate a student’s banner advocating illegal drug
use and ban “student speech at a school event” from promoting
illegal drug use, in violation of school policy.308 All of these cases
cited and reaffirmed Tinker.
The response of the Ninth Circuit in Dariano was to reject
Tinker and uphold the heckler’s veto.309 Dariano upheld the
power of the Morgan Hill Unified School District to order
students to cover up the U.S. flag shirts or go home, because, the
District claimed, if some students wore those colors on Cinco de
Mayo, the fifth of May, celebrating Mexican heritage and pride,
other students might turn to violence.310 The school ban on the
students wearing American flag colors, as the district court
explained, was “in order to protect their own safety.”311
However, these same school administrators did not ask any
students to refrain from wearing the colors of the Mexican flag
because, they said, students wearing American flags “were
threatened with violence,” but students with Mexican flag colors
were not.312 One might say that the Anglo students were
threatened, but the “Mexican students” (the term the court
repeatedly used) were not. Hence, “all students whose safety was
in jeopardy were treated equally.”313
The court invented a most unusual rule: If hecklers threaten
students who do nothing but wear colors that reflect the
American flag, the school authorities should restrict the peaceful
students, not the rowdy hecklers. If that is the law, what the
lawyers for the principals in Tinker should have advised them
was that they could punish the doves if only the hawks had
physically threatened and hit the doves. Surely, that cannot be
what the Tinker Court intended.
Recall, Tinker found it telling that the school principals did
not ban all symbols; they allowed students to wear Democratic
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007).
309 Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764,766 (9th Cir. 2014).
310 See id. at 767.
311 Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal.
2011), aff’d, 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).
312 Id. at 1045–46.
313 Id.
307
308
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campaign buttons even if that upset Republicans. 314 The
principals allowed students to wear a symbol of the Nazis, the
Iron Cross.315 The fact that principals distinguished among the
types of buttons that were verboten was evidence that the school
principals were banning symbols because of their content, their
message. This was not a case where the school principals said, for
example, that no students could wear armbands or any other
symbols on their school band uniforms because the whole point of
uniforms is to be, well, uniform.
Yet, in California, the rule is different. Mexican students can
wear Mexican flag colors, but others cannot wear American flag
colors. Why? The trial court claimed that the Mexican students
were threatening the other students, but the trial court found no
evidence that anyone was threatening the Mexican students, so
the school only protected the hecklers. 316
Let us apply the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to other
situations. Assume that some students wear the Star of David
and other students object and threaten them. These other
students wear the Iron Cross. The Star of David students
(perhaps grandchildren of those who barely survived the
Holocaust) do not threaten violence. The Ninth Circuit rule
would allow the Iron Cross—but not the Star of David—because
only the Iron Cross students threatened violence. As the trial
court said in Dariano, to support its restriction of free speech, a
male student “shoved a Mexican flag at [a student with an
American flag symbol] and said something in Spanish expressing
anger at Plaintiffs’ clothing.” 317 The remedy that the Dariano
court chose was not to punish the student who “shoved a Mexican
flag” at the other student, but to take away the free speech rights
of that other student.
That is not what our high schools should be teaching students.
We live in a diverse society and, in the words of Tinker,
“apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.”318 Instead, the Ninth Circuit and the Morgan
Hill Unified School District prefer to teach schoolchildren that, if you
want to shut up other fellow students, just rely on the heckler’s veto.
This school district is not very good at teaching tolerance: Earlier, gay
students sued this same school district for failing to take action to
protect them from harassment from their fellow students.319 It would
314
315
316
317
318
319

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510–11 (1969).
Id.
Dariano, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
Id. at 1044.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
See generally Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
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be much better if the school followed Rodney King’s plea that we all
should learn to “get along.”
VIII. CONCLUSION
A newspaper exchange occurred several years ago in a
prominent legal newspaper on the pros and cons of government
restrictions on the press corps covering the first Persian Gulf
War.320 It illustrated a peculiar American tradition. While we
cling to our First Amendment rights to engage in robust debate
about national affairs and, ultimately, to dissent from the
policies of our government, we also indulge a penchant for
robustly debating the conditions under which we should carry out
our robust debates about national affairs. You might call this the
First Amendment squared.
If there is any disadvantage to this preoccupation, it is that
outsiders—for example, dictators like Kim Jong-un of North
Korea—may interpret failure of the United States Government
to stifle debate and dissent as a sign of weakness and
divisiveness, perhaps not understanding that dissent in
America is par for the course.
None of this gives cause to limit or even question our traditional
freedoms. But it’s worth a moment of appreciation for what we enjoy
and a warning about the importance of preserving our expressive
freedoms even—especially—when they become most inconvenient.
The lesson that strength lies in free speech goes back at least
as far as ancient Athens. Strength does not lie in enforced
silence, but rather in robust dissent. The lessons of history should
teach us that any efforts by war supporters to attack dissent
would be adopting the rules of dictators as our own. Our way is to
slug it out domestically. There is no point at which debate is
closed. There is no point at which the only acceptable course of
action is to rally ‘round. Those who will argue—as some always
do—that our soldiers will be demoralized by domestic dissent sell
them short and do not understand the premium our Constitution
places on free speech, or the power that freedom yields.
The free speech that we now protect in times of war is
handmaiden to the free speech we must protect in times of peace.
Hateful speech is, well, hateful, but the remedy, history teaches
us, is more speech, not less. We protect the rights of Nazis to

320

See Press Limits: Censorship or Prudence?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at 19.
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march in Skokie, Illinois, so civil rights protestors can march in
Selma, Alabama.321
If we gathered members of the early Congress (which
enacted the Alien and Sedition Laws) and members of the
Supreme Court (during the time it adopted the “bad tendency
test” in the beginning of the twentieth century), they would
advise us that a country could not conduct a war successfully if
the government allows those opposed to it to speak out against it
openly. They would advise us that allowing people to spew
hurtful speech, could cause unrest and dissension. Throughout
most of our history, any such gathering would produce the same
answer. Yet Herodotu, Pericles, Aeschylus, and their fellow
Athenians knew better.
There are those who say it is more difficult for a democracy
to go to war because it cannot conduct the war successfully if the
people oppose it. That is a good thing, not a bad thing. In modern
times, no democracy has warred against another. As Pericles
reminds us, “The great impediment to action is, in our opinion,
not discussion, but the want of knowledge that is gained by
discussion preparatory to action.”322
When the world is full of democracies and the despots and
terrorists whom they harbor are no more, then we will have
lasting peace. On the home front, there will always be those
who preach hate, but we will learn to turn away and ignore
their message or undercut the speech we do not like with more
speech, rather than enforced silence. American’s experience
with free speech tells us something else. The United States has
not only survived but it has thrived, when it allows dissent,
even in times of war. And when it punished dissent, our
history teaches us that the people who enforce the censorship
are not wise Platonic guardians.
Under modern free speech doctrine, the government may
not prohibit or punish hateful, provocative, or offensive speech
unless it proves incitement, a term of art that requires the
government to prove that the speaker both subjectively and
objectively intended to incite immediate, unthinking lawless
violence before a volatile crowd in a situation that makes this
intention likely to be successful. The government, under this

321 See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 110 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (enjoining
defendants from interfering with a proposed civil rights march along U.S. Highway 80
from Selma to Montgomery which sought government redress for being deprived of the
right to vote).
322 Pericles, supra note 54, at 118–19.
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test, could prohibit haranguing a lynch mob but could not
punish hate speech.
As Senator John F. Kennedy said, while running for
President, “We must know all the facts, and hear all the
alternatives, and listen to all the criticisms. Let us welcome
controversial books and controversial authors. For the Bill of
Rights is the guardian of our security as well as our liberty.” 323
When he said that, he echoed the ancient Greeks. There is little
new under the sun.

323 John
F. Kennedy, Response to Questionnaire, in Irving Kolodin, The
Candidates and the Arts, SATURDAY REV ., Oct. 29, 1960, at 42, 44; see also TATYANA
E CKSTRAND , THE LIBRARIAN’ S B OOK OF Q UOTES 10 (2009); LIBRARY OF C ONGRESS ,
R ESPECTFULLY Q UOTED : A D ICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 29 (2010).
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